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Duncan v. Walker
121 S. Ct. 2120 (2001)
L Faz
InJune 1992, a juryfound Sherman Walker ("Walker") guiltyof first degree
robbery in Queens County Supreme Court and he was sentenced to seven to
fourteen years in prison. The State Appellate Division affimed Walker's convic-
tion in June 1995, and the New York Court of Appeals denied him leave to
appeal conviction in January 1996. After Walker pursued several state remedies
unsuccessfully, his conviction became final in April 1996. On April 10, 1996,
Walker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of NewYork. This petition was dismissed without
trejudice in July 1996 because Walker "had not adequately set forth his claim
ecause it was not apparent that [Walker] had exhausted available state reme-
dies." '
Almost one year after his first habeas petition was dismissed, Walker filed
a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. This second
petition was dismissed as untimelypursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death PenaltyAct of 1996 (AEDPA)2 because Walker had filed it more than one
year after the effective date of AEDPA. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Crcuit reversed this judgment and reinstated the habeas petition,
holding that Walker's first federal habeas petition had tolled the limitation period,
and thus the petition was not untimelyI
II. Hii4
The United States Supreme Court rejected the Second Crcuit's interpreta-
tion of 28 U.S.C S 2244(d)(2).4 The Court held that Walker's first habeas
petition did not toll the limitation period because it was not "other collateral
review" within the meaning of S 2244.' Thus, the Court found that Walker's
second petition for habeas corpus was time barred.6
1. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S. C. 2120,2123 (2001).
2. Anti-Terrorismand Effective Death PenakyAct, Pub. L No. 104-132, SS 101,106,110
Stat. 1214, 1220 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C S 2244 (Supp. V 2001)).
3. War, 121 S. C. at 2124.
4. Id at 2123-24; seealso 28 US.C S 2244(d)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
5. Wake, 121 S. CL at 2129.
6. Id
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Tide 28 U.S.C S 2244(')(2) reads: "The time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period
of limitation under this subsection."' Under S 2244(d), there is a one-year statute
of limitations in which a state prisoner mayfile an application in federal court for
a writ of habeas corpus. This one-year period runs from the date on which the
state criminal judgment became final' However, anyprisoner whose conviction
became final prior to AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996, was granted a
one-year grace period in which to file a habeas petition, or until April 24, 1997."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Clrcuit noted that
because Walker's conviction became final prior to AEDPA's effective date, he
had until April 24,1997, to f his federal habeas petition." The Second Grcuit
held that Walker's first habeas petition tolled the limitation period because it fell
within the definition of "other collateral review" under S 2244(d)(2)." The
Second Crcuit reasoned that the word "State" applied onlyto "post conviction,"
and that the "other collateral" review could include federal habeas petitions as
well as state collateral review." Thus, the court held that Walker's habeas
petition was timely, as the limitation period had been tolled before one year had
expired.'
4
The State asserted that the word "State" in S 2244 applies to the entire
phrase "post-conviction or other collateral review.""5 Under this viewthe statute
only covers state collateral review, and a federal habeas petition would not toll
the limitation period.'6 Thus, New York argued that Walker's second petition for
federal habeas corpus was time-barred because it had been filed after the one-
year limitation period."
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the State's interpretation of
the statute. 8 The Court determined that its role in the case was to interpret the
7. S 2244(d)(2).
8. Id
9. Waller v. Artuz, 208 F3d 357,359 (2d CAr. 2000) (recognizing that unless a conviction
became final prior to April 24, 1996, a petitioner has one year from the date of his final criminal
state judgment in which to fle an application for a writ of habeas corpus); see a/o S 2244(d).
10. Wake, 208 F.3d at 359.
11. Walke., 121 S. Ca. at 2123.
12. Id; see aso S 2244(d) (2).
13. Walker, 121 S. 0. at 2124.
14. Id at 2123.






statute byconstruing what Congress had enacted.' 9 In doing so, the Court began
with the language of the statute ° Walker contended that Congress included the
phrase "other collateral review" to incorporate federal habeas petitions into the
types of review that could toll the limitation period." However, the Court held
that "had Congress intended to include federal habeas petitions within the scope
of S 2244(d)(2), Congress would have mentioned 'Federal' review expressly."'
The Court compared S 2244(d)(2) with other sections of AEDPA in which
Congress has specifically used both the words "State" and "Federal," such as S
2254(), which provides that "[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel
during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a
ground for relief in a proceeding arising under S 22 54 ."' Contrasting such
language with the language in S 2244(d)(2), the Court held that S 2244(d)(2) could
not applyto federal habeas petitions because Congress onlyemployed the word
"State," and not "Federal," as a modifier for review. " 24 The Court relied on
Bae u Unai Stw!' in holding that "[w]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generallypresumed that Congress acts intentionallyand purposelyin the
disparate inclusion or exclusion."
6
The Court also found that it has a duty to give effect to every word of a
statute.27 It found that applying Walker's interpretation of the statute would
render the word "State" superfluous. 8 The Court stated that it was "especially
unwilling to [treat statutory terms as surplusage] when the term occupies so
pivotal a place in the statutory scheme as does the word 'State' in the federal
habeas statute."' The Court found that if the statute were to include both state
and federal collateral review, the word "State" would place "no constraint on the
class of applications for review that toll the limitation period."30 The Court
found that "[t]he clause instead would have preciselythe same content were it to
19. Id
20. Id (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 420, 431 (2000) (explaining that in construing
legislation, the court begins with the language of the statute and assigns to words their ordinary,
common meaning, absent legislative intent to assign different meaning)).
21. Wker, 121 S. C. at 2124.
22. Id
23. Waker, 121 S. O. at 2124; se 28 US.C S 2254(@ (Supp. 2001).
24. Waker, 121 S. C. at 2125.
25. 522 US. 23 (1997).
26. Walker, 121 S. Q. at 2125 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 US. 16, 23 (1983))
(citing Bates v. United States, 522 US. 23, 29-30 (1997)).
27. Id (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 US. 528,538-39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 US. 147, 152 (1883) (holding that it is the court's duty "'to give effect, if possible,






read 'post-conviction or other collateral review.""1 The Court held that because
it had a dutyto "'give each word some operative effect' where possible," it could
not accept Walker's proposed construction of S 2244(d)(2)2
The Second rcuit reasoned that New York's reading of the statute did not
give effect to the phrase "other collateral review.""3 That court held that "the
phrase 'other collateral review' would be meaningless if it did not refer to federal
habeas petitions."14 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second
Crcuit's finding because it reasoned that the statute referred to state "collateral"
review as being the review "other" than "post-conviction" review.3" The court
found that the phrase "other collateral review" could include "review of a state
court judgment that is not a criminal conviction."36 The Court also found that
in addition to a state criminal conviction "there are other types of state court
judgments pursuant to which a person maybe held in custodywithin the mean-
ing of the federal habeas statute," including a state court order of civil commit-
ment or a state court order of civil contempt Accordingly, state collateral
review pertaining to these judgments would not be post-conviction review."
Thus, the Court found that even if "State post-conviction review" referred to all
state collateral review of a conviction, "the phrase 'other collateral review need
not include federal habeas petitions in order to have independent meaning.",
The United States Supreme Court also found that Congress mayhave used
the phrase "post-conviction or other collateral" in order to accommodate the
diverse terminology that different states employ to refer to the different forms
of collateral reviewthat are available after a conviction.0 It found that "Congress
may have refrained from exclusive reliance on the term 'post-conviction' so as
to leave no doubt that the tolling provision applies to all types of state collateral
review available after a conviction and not just to those denominated 'post-
conviction' in the parlance of a particular jurisdiction.""' Thus, "other collateral"
review does not have to refer to federal habeas petitions in order to have an
effect.
42
31. Wakeer, 121 S. CO. at 2125.
32. Id at 2126 (quoting Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 US. 202, 209
(1997) (explaining that courts should interpret statutes so that, if possible, no word is rendered
superfluous)).
33. Id
34. Walker v. Artuz, 208 F.3d 357, 360 (2d CAr. 2000).










Walker contended that New York's construction of the statute created "the
potential for unfairness to litigants who file timely federal habeas petitions that
are dismissed without prejudice after the limitation period has expired."43
However, the Court articulated that its "sole task in this case [was] one of
statutory construction."" The Court held that federal habeas corpus review is
not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review," and that
thus, S 2244(d)(2) did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of
Walker's first habeas petition."
Mytli A. Jayamman
43. Id at 2129.
44. id
45. Id
2001]

